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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-Choice of Law-Domiciliary law applies
to establish host liability for out-of-state automobile accident.
Clark v. Clark (N.H. 1966).
While traveling in Vermont on a trip from Lancaster, New
Hampshire, to Littleton, New Hampshire, the parties were in-
volved in an automobile accident. Seeking damages from her
husband for injuries sustained in the accident, the plaintiff
moved for a pre-trial order that the substantive law of New
Hampshire, the parties' residence, governed their rights. The
superior court reserved all questions of law and transferred
without ruling. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, held,
remanded with advice to enter a pre-trial order. Where the host
and the guest who were domiciled in New Hampshire and who
intended to return to New Hampshire after their trip were in-
volved in an automobile accident in Vermont, New Hampshire
law applied, and the guest could recover for injuries caused by
the host's ordinary negligence. Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205
(N.H. 1966).
The traditional choice of law rule in the tort field is the law
of the place of injury. However, a strict application of this rule
has never been recommended, and the courts are tending to let
other factors influence their choice. 1 As Clark said of this tradi-
tional rule, "no conflict of laws authority in America today
agrees that the old rule should be retained .... No American
court which has felt free to re-examine the matter thoroughly in
the last decade has chosen to retain the old rule."' Even the
courts that have kept the place of injury rule do so not because
of a belief that the old rule is a good one but because of an un-
willingness to overrule established precedent until a better rule
is clearly available.3
1. The leading authorities in the conflict of laws field have long criticized
a blanket application of this lez loci delicti rule. See CooKc, THE LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASIS OF CONFLICt OF LAW (1942) ; HANcOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICTS
oF LAW (1942); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. Rxv. 881
(1951); Cheatham, America* Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 383 (1945); Yntema, The Hornbook Method
and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
2. Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 207 (N.H. 1966).
3. The South Carolina Supreme Court has chosen to ignore the more
recent trend and follow the traditional lex loci delicti rule. In the face of
Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959),
and other cases which adopted and elucidated the grouping of contacts, the
South Carolina court thought it wise to wait until this new theory became
880
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It is generally conceded that a strict application of the place
of injury rule can lead to some curious and unjust results. 4 For
this reason various devices have been employed to avoid applica-
tion of the old rule. Some cases have used renvoi devices to avoid
the application. Others have substituted a characterization ap-
proach, whereby the choice of law is determined by the category
in which the case falls. If the issue can be termed contract,5
family law,6 procedural7 or if it involves a strong public policy,"
a choice of law other than the place of injury may be justified.
In spite of their use, these devices are not entirely satisfactory,
and there has been a definite and substantial trend toward a
more preferable approach, commonly referred to as the grouping
of contacts. Under this approach a court will consider all the
acts of the parties touching the transaction in relation to the
several states involved and will apply the law of that state with
which the facts are in most intimate contact. This is a qualitative
rather than a quantitative consideration of the contacts. The
advantage in this approach is that a court is free to recognize
special interests that one state may have in a case, and yet it
is not free to choose indiscriminately. Further, since it is possible
that different states will have the most significant contact with
various issues presented in one case, the issues can be split, and
the law applied to each issue will be that of the jurisdiction
having the most significant contact with that issue.9
The grouping of contacts has been rather widely accepted,
especially in the area of guest-host liability. The landmark case
is Babcole; v. Jackson o where two New York residents were
involved in an accident while traveling in Ontario, and the guest
sought to recover for the host's negligence. The New York Court
more certain and established. "We do not deem it wise to voyage into such
an uncharted sea, leaving behind well-established conflict of laws rules."
Osheik v. Osheik, 244 S.C. 249, 255, 136 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash.
1955) ; Nadeau v. Power Plant Eng'r Co., 216 Ore. 12, 337 P.2d 313 (1959);
Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
5. See Levy v. Daniel's U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 353, 143 Atl.
163 (1928).
6. See Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959).
7. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
8. See Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).
9. Note, 18 S.C.L. Rtv. 453, 457, 464 (1966).
10. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See Cavers,
Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1212
(1963).
1966]
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of Appeals rejected the lex loci delicti rule because the place of
injury was held to be merely fortuitous. In its place the court
weighed the interests and policies of the two jurisdictions in-
volved, New York and Ontario, and applied New York law
which it determined to be more intimately concerned with the
outcome. While the place of the injury was considered, it was
merely one factor to be weighed with the others and was not
determinative on the question of host liability."1
Clark v. Clark12 also involves the possible application of a
foreign guest statute, the spousal relation of the parties being
irrelevant to the issues considered. New Hampshire, the forum
state, does not have a guest statute, and a guest may recover
from a host for injuries caused by the host's ordinary negligence.
The Vermont guest statute limits recovery to injuries caused by
the host's gross and willful negligence. While the grouping of
contacts was not mentioned by name, Clark used this kind of ap-
proach and cited with approval the principal cases that espouse
the new choice.
In determining the proper choice of law, both the place of
injury and the straight characterization approaches were re-
jected. Instead, the Clark court set out what it deemed to be
five relevant considerations and concluded that "choice of law
decisions ought to be based directly upon these relevant consid-
erations, rather than any mechanical rule or technique of ad hoc
characterization derived indirectly from such considerations."'18
Predictability of legal result in advance of the event was found
to be a largely irrelevant consideration in this case "since auto-
mobile accidents are not planned."' 4 The second consideration
was the maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relation-
ship among the states. The court felt that this consideration in
the area of automobile accident litigation required only the
application of "the law of no state which does not have sub-
stantial connection with the total facts and with the particular
issue being litigated."' 5 This is the essence of the grouping of
contacts. The use of either New Hampshire or Vermont law in
this case would affect neither interstate travel nor state sensi-
11. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1963).
12. 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966).
13. Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 208 (N.H. 1966).
14. Id. at 209.
15. Id. at 208.
[Vol. 18
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bilities. Simplification of judicial task was the third considera-
tion, but the court observed that while a mechanical rule would
be easier to apply, simplification was not the whole end, and
opposing considerations could outweigh it. Further, the court
could use either state's law with relative ease. Also considered
was governmental interest, and New Hampshire was found to
have an interest in applying its law to its own residents. The
parties resided in New Hampshire, they maintained their car and
insurance under this state's laws, and their trip was to begin
and end there. The court felt these factors "would have led them
to anticipate application of our law to them."' 6 These same fac-
tors were present in Babcock and persuaded the New York court
to apply New York law. Also like Babcock, the court distin-
guished guest-host liability from rules of the road. The latter
should be determined by the law of the place of injury because
that state has an interest in regulating conduct on its highways.
As to guest statutes, "the factors that bear on the guest-host
relationship all center in New Hampshire."'1 7 Lastly, the court
must consider its preference for what it views as the sounder rule.
If the law of the other state is outmoded, courts have always
tried to apply their own law, although usually covering it up by
using characterization and renvoi devices. New Hampshire law
was preferable to that of Vermont, chiefly because the com-
plexion of automobile accident legislation has changed so much
since the guest statutes were enacted in the 1920's and early
1930's. These old guest statutes "contradict the spirit of the
times. . . .Unless other considerations demand it, we shall not
go out of our way to enforce such a law of another state as
against the better law of our own state."' 8 Thus, the court held
that all the relevant considerations led clearly to the application
of New Hampshire law.
Clark tends to eliminate the confusion that could have arisen
from such cases as Freund 'v. iSpenver.'9 There the court held
that the law of Vermont as the place of injury determined the
"issue of negligence," while the grouping of contacts rule re-
quired application of New York law as the residence of the
parties to determine the rights and liabilities stemming from the
guest-host relationship. Vermont's guest statute requires a show-
16. Id. at 209.
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 210.
19. 46 Misc. 2d 472, 260 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
1966]
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ing of gross negligence to establish the host's liability. The New
York law in Freund and the New Hampshire law in Clark re-
quire only ordinary negligence. If, as Freund says, the law of
the place of injury determines the "issue of negligence," it would
seem that the plaintiff is required to meet the Vermont gross
negligence rule. However, since this requirement does not seem
to have been met, the Freund court must have meant the nature
of conduct necessary to establish a wrongful act, when it said
"issue of negligence." This is similar to what the Clark court
referred to as "rules of the road." So, suppose Vermont law
required that a car merely slow down at a stop sign, and a New
York guest was injured in Vermont because the host only slowed
down and did not stop. It would be unimportant what New York
law said on the subject because the New York court would refer
to Vermont law to determine whether the host acted properly.
Since he complied with the law of the state in which he was
driving, his conduct was free from any taint of negligence. On
the other hand, once it can be established under the law of the
place of injury that the host's conduct was wrongful, reference
will be had to the law of the state most intimately concerned in
order to determine the rights and liabilities arising out of the
guest-host relationship. Suppose New York law permitted one
to merely slow down at a stop sign, but Vermont law stated that
such conduct constituted ordinary negligence. If the New York
guest was injured in Vermont when the host failed to stop, the
host would be guilty of ordinary negligence. The Vermont guest
statute, however, requires a showing of gross negligence to estab-
lish the host's liability. According to Clark and Freund, the
New York court would refer to Vermont law to establish that
the host acted wrongfully. Then it would apply its own law to
establish the host's liability, resulting in the guest only having
to prove ordinary negligence.
This interpretation of Freund and Clark squares with the
general considerations of the grouping of contacts rule.20 As
20. Clark is also in accord with RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 379 (Tent Draft No. 9, 1964).
Circumstances under which a guest passenger has a right of action
against the driver of an automobile for injuries suffered as a result of
the latter's negligence will be determined by the local law of their com-
mon domicile, if at law this is the state from which they departed on
their trip and that to which they intended to return, rather than by the
local law of the state where the accident occurred.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra at comment d. See also
RESTATMiENT (SEcOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 379 comment f (Tent Draft
No. 9, 1964).
[Vol. 18
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early as Babcock, it was recognized that questions concerning
the nature of the defendant's conduct must be distinguished from
questions involving the relationship of the parties. 21 The state
where the injury occurred has an interest in seeing that its rules
of the road are enforced, so that users of its highways will be
protected. For this reason, its law will determine the rightness
or wrongness of the conduct. Thus, through a grouping of con-
tacts and, as in Clark, through an analysis of all relevant con-
siderations, the courts do not seek a complete overturning of
the place of injury rule. Rather, the courts are attempting to
discourage a mechanical use of this old rule by encouraging con-
sideration of all relevant interests, and in this way are develop-
ing a more flexible and just choice of law rule.
MARY Jo SoT'nX
21. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963). See also Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup.
Ct. 1965).
1966]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Reapportionment- South Carolina
Senate Reapportionment Act acceptable only as an interim
measure. O'Shdelds v. McNair (D.S.C. 1966).
The plaintiffs brought an action challenging the constitution-
ality of the South Carolina Senate reapportionment scheme em-
bodied in the Act of February 3, 19661 and seeking an injunction
prohibiting further elections to the South Carolina Senate as
then apportioned. The District Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit,
Leld, that the plan for reapportionment of the South Carolina
Senate would be accepted as an interim measure, exclusive of its
section providing for a four year term of office. O'ihields v.
MoNair, 254 F. Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966).
In a sister case, the constitutionality of the provisions of the
South Carolina Constitution of 18952 requiring periodic reap-
portionment of the House of Representatives was challenged.
3
After Reynolds V. Sims,4 which held that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned on a
population basis, it was evident that South Carolina's Senate
apportionment did not meet the test of constitutionality. The
South Carolina Senate undertook the task of reapportioning
itself and the Act of February 3, 1966 represents the fruits of
that endeavor. Embodied in sections 1 and 2 of the Act were two
reapportionment plans. The court considered the section 1 plan
in the present case.5
The plan met its first difficulties in regard to the South Caro-
lina Constitution. The court noted that it was in violation of
Article III, Section 80 in that the Act provided for election of
Senators for four-year terms. The desirability and need for a
constitutional amendment was'indicated in order for the General
Assembly to be competent to effectuate the Act. The plan also
conflicted with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution of
1. Act of February 3, 1966, 54 Stat. 2016.
2. S.C. CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 4 (1895).
3. Mungo v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966). The court here
held that South Carolina's apportionment of the House of Representatives
among counties was not inconsistent with the federal requirement of apportion-
ment on a population basis.
4. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. Act of February 3, 1966, 54 Stat. 2016.
6. S.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 8 (1895), which provides that: "Senators shall
be so classified that one-half of their number, as nearly as practicable, shall
be chosen every two years."
7
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South Carolina.7 Here, again, the court advised use of the amend-
ment procedure.
Aside from state constitutional considerations, the true test of
the apportionment scheme's validity would be the requirements
of the Federal Constitution. In considering the constitutionality
of the Act of February 3, 1966, the district court could have fol-
lowed a path marked by precedent through the political thicket
of reapportionment.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baker v.
Carr" indicated that the task of effectuating reapportionment of
the state legislatures was on the near horizon.9 It was in the
leading case of Reynolds v. Sims that the problem of determining
standards and guidelines for implementing the Baker v. Carr
decision was met.' 0 Here, the court, guided by the principle of
equal representation for equal numbers of people, held that the
equal protection clause required the utilization of a population
basis in apportioning state legislatures." The Court acknowl-
edged that some deviation from the equal-population principle is
permissible if such deviation is based on legitimate considera-
tions in relation to a rational state policy; thus, mathematical
preciseness was not demanded.12
A United States District Court, in holding Georgia reappor-
tionment plans unconstitutional, indicated that a variance of
more than fifteen percent with the one man-one vote principle
would be difficult to justify.13 However, the United States
Supreme Court, while upholding the district court's invalida-
tion of Delaware apportionment schemes, stated that the appor-
tionment problem did not lend itself to a uniform mathematical
formula; rather, the test should be a good faith effort to effectu-
ate a plan of population based representation. 4 Thus, variances
7. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 6 (1895) which reads:
The Senate shall be composed of one member from each county, to be
elected for the term of four years by the qualified electors in each
county, in the same manner in which members of the House of Repre-
sentatives are chosen.
The court here noted that the numbers of counties fixed the number of Sena-
tors. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D.S.C. 1966).
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and
Equal Protection, 61 MIcH. L. REv. 645 (1963).
10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533 (1964).
11. Id. at 568.
12. Id. at 577.
13. Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
14. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964).
1966]
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with the equal population norm do not automatically invalidate
an apportionment scheme.'0 A gross deviation should, however,
prove fatal.16
As the law now stands, rationality and legitimate state inter-
est coupled with the equal population principle form the con-
trolling criteria and point of departure in legislative apportion-
ment controversies.1'7 It was within this framework of the law
that the district court endeavored to place its decision in
Q'Ahields v. AcNair.
The court, while indicating that some variance is permissible,18
pointed out that the South Carolina Senate plan entailed sub-
stantial departures from the fifteen percent norm.19 The district
court also expressed grave doubts as to the validity of the "nega-
tive residence" requirement in the section 1 plan. This residence
requirement provides that no more than one Senator may be a
resident of a county in a multi-county, multi-Senator district
unless that county's population is 115% or more of the popula-
tion base per Senator.20 Thus, some small counties would be
guaranteed a resident Senator while, because of the districting,
larger counties would have no such right. Considered in the
light of population differences among the counties such a pro-
vision would, to some extent, restrict the rights of voters in a
multi-county district.2 '
While not expressly ruling as to whether the variance in equal
population among the counties and the residence requirement
would invalidate the reapportionment plan, the court felt that
the record provided insufficient justification for the measures
and did not dispel doubts as to their constitutionality. The
record, as viewed by the court, did not foreclose the inference
15. See Roman v. Sincock, .rpra note 14; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 727, 730 (1964); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96
(M.D. Ala. 1965); Schoefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247 (D. Wyo. 1964).
16. See Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S.
656, 673 (1964).
17. Annot., 12 L. Ed. 2d 1282, 1284, 1285 (1963).
18. Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1965). But see Roman
v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
19. With an average population for each Senator of 47,652 people, four of
twenty-seven districts vary from the population norm by more than the pre-
sumptive maximum. Berkeley County is over-represented by 17.42%, Oconee
by 15.63% and Calhoun and Orangeburg by 15.20%. Charleston is under-
represented by 13.52%, Darlington by 11.08% and Greenville by 10.06%.
20. Act of February 3, 1966 § 1 (e), 54 Stat. 2016.
21. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708, 713-14 (D.S.C. 1966). But see
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
Vol. 18
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that the population basis had been diluted by efforts to preserve
the old power structure.
22
Expressing doubt as to the constitutionality of Section 1 of
the Act of February 3, 1966, the court accepted it as an interim
measure. This was done because of limited time remaining before
the 1966 elections and in hopes that an acceptable plan would
be forthcoming from the Senate.23
It is questionable whether postponement of acceptable reap-
portionment in the Senate until the general elections of 1968
would meet with Supreme Court approval. 24 Yet, a longer period
of delay could not be justified. Hopefully, by the end of the 1967
session of the General Assembly, South Carolina will have an
acceptable plan for Senate apportionment.
H. EDWARD SMT
22. O'Shields v. McNair, sgpra note 21, at 713.
23. Id. at 716.
24. See Sevanson v. Adams, 382 U.S. 210 (1966). The Supreme Court
reversed, per curiam without a hearing, acceptance of Florida's legislative
reapportionment as an interim plan.
1966]
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EVIDENCE-Discovery-Deposition of an Adverse Witness-
N*o showing of good and sufficient cause is required for the pre-
trial examination of an adverse witness. Proctor v. Corley's
Garage (S.C. 1965).
The plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for alleged
personal injuries sustained while at the defendant's place of
business. The defendant, pursuant to section 26-701 of the South
Carolina Code,' made written application to the clerk of court
for an order requiring the physician who treated the plaintiff
subsequent to the injuries sustained, to appear before the clerk
and give testimony on oral examination to be conducted by the
attorney for the defendant. The clerk issued the order, and the
plaintiff moved for dismissal on the grounds that there was no
showing that an examination of the physician is required by the
defendant pursuant to section 26-701, and that no good and
sufficient cause was shown for the necessity of the examination.
The lower court dismissed the order, after a finding that the
purpose of section 26-701 is to preserve and perpetuate a party's
own testimony and not that of an adverse party or witness. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, reversed.
No showing of good and sufficient cause was required as a condi-
tion of application for the examination of a witness. Proctor v.
Corley's Garage, 246 S.C. 478, 144 S.E.2d 285 (1965). (5-to-0).
The Proctor case did not overrule earlier decisions, but it did
clarify previous misconceptions and end confusion by setting out
the court's interpretation of section 26-701. One of the questions
which Proctor settled was the meaning of the section's designa-
tion of "any witness." It was contended by the plaintiff and de-
termined by the lower court that "any witness" did not refer to
adverse witnesses, but only to those of the party applying for
the deposition. At first consideration it seems that Cook 'v.
Douglas2 substantiates this contention in that the court did not
allow the defendant to take the testimony of an adverse witness
pursuant to section 26-701. Upon closer examination, however,
a different result becomes apparent. The defendant attempted
to take the testimony of two passengers in an automobile, each
of whom was suing the defendant for damages arising out of
the same accident. The court held that there was such a substan-
tial identity of interests between each plaintiff as a witness in
1. S.C. COD AwN. § 26-701 (1962).
2. 243 S.C. 201, 133 S.E.2d 209 (1963).
[Vol. 18
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the case of the other and as an actual party in his own case, that
each of them occupied, in effect, the position of adverse parties;
therefore, any taking of their testimony under section 26-701
was precluded. This section "'provides a mode by which a party
to an action may preserve and perpetuate his own testimony or
that of any witness in the cause,' but an adverse party is not a
witness within the meaning of that section."3
The Proctor case also clarified the question of whether or not
a showing of "good and sufficient cause" is necessary for taking
a deposition pursuant to section 26401. In Fox v. Clifton Mfg.
Co.4 the court held that a party had an absolute right to exam-
ine an adverse party without procuring an order from the court
or assigning any reason. The legislature, in 1923, in response
to the Fox decision, amended the statute upon which section
26-5035 was based, so as to require a showing of "good and
sufficient cause" to take the deposition of an adverse party.6
Determination of whether sufficient cause has been shown is a
matter addressed to the discretion of the circuit judge.7
No such amendment was made to section 26-701. The two code
sections are of different origins and deal with distinctly differ-
ent subjects. Sections 26-501 through 26-512 "provide the exclu-
sive method for obtaining a pretrial examination of an adverse
party, but may not be invoked for the purpose of securing the
examination of any other witness." s Section 26-701 provides for
the taking of the depositions of "any other witness."
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has often stated that
counsel cannot engage in "fishing expeditions" under the guise
of discovery. 9 It seems, however, that the court in Proctor has
backed away from this proposition and, in regard to the taking of
depositions of adverse witnesses, has opened the "fishing season."
The attitude of the court in Proctor has subsequently been
demonstrated in the more recent case of E x parte Goodyear Tire
3. Cook v. Douglas, 243 S.C. 201, 203-04, 133 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1963)
quoting in part from Cook v. Douglas, 240 S.C. 373, 126 S.E2d 20 (1962).
4. 122 S.C. 86, 114 S.E. 700 (1922).
5. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 26-503 (1962).
6. Proctor v. Corley's Garage, 246 S.C. 478, 144 S.E.2d 285 (1965).
7. Williams v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 224 S.C. 415, 79 S.E2d 365 (1953);
Planter's Fertilizer & Phosphate Co. v. McCreight, 187 S.C. 483, 198 S.E. 405
(1938).
8. Proctor v. Corley's Garage, 246 S.C. 478, 144 S.E.2d 285 (1965).
9. ERg., Royster v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 193 S.C. 468, 8 S.E.2d 875 (1940);
Mahaffey v. Southern Ry., 175 S.C. 198, 178 S.E. 838 (1935).
1966]
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& Rubber Co.10 which allowed inspection by the defendant of a
chattel in the possession of an adverse party. These decisions are
indicative of the court's willingness to liberalize discovery pro-
cedures to a similar end as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
JoEL E. GoTTmum
10. Ex Parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 150 S.E2d 525 (S.C. 1966) ; See
18 S.C.L. REv. 701 (1966).
[Vol. 18
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